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Abstract
Slovakia‟s transition history long paralleled that of the Czech Republic, but the former
adopted bold new reforms early in this decade. This paper is a comparative treatment of fiscal
decentralization since 1993 and more recent reforms of public administration, the two efforts
representing the foundation of the New System. Czech experience is invoked simply to provide an
appropriate benchmark for the evaluation of Slovakia‟s New System introduced in 2004, including
the 19% “flat tax” and other striking measures in local public finance.
The second focus of the paper is on the macro-economic impact of the New System. It is
too early to perceive what its long-term effects will be, so this treatment will be more tentative. But
because one would like to know whether Slovakia‟s return to an economic growth path is actually a
result of the New System and whether this recent growth will persist, those issues are given some
consideration.

1

Slovakia’s Surge: The New System’s Impact on Fiscal Decentralization
I. Introduction
Well into its economic transition, the Slovak Republic has only recently begun to diverge in
substantive ways from a path of joint development with the Czech Republic. Although the two
countries shared a lot of common experience through the central planning era and even into the
transition period up to the Velvet Divorce of 1993, subtle but durable differences going back to the
period before World War I remain a part of their diverse cultures. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
the Czechs had developed a more industrial and centralized society than the Slovaks, whose
associations during that same period were with the Hungarians. This paper attempts to show how
that early tradition is currently being reasserted in the fiscal relations between central and
subnational governments in the Slovak Republic.
Public sector foundations of Czechoslovakia‟s transition to market democracy were modeled
to some extent on West European tradition. It was after such institutions were established in
legislation that the Czech and Slovak Republics agreed in 1993 to go separate ways. The Velvet
Divorce opened the way for divergent fiscal developments, but for the first decade of the separation
there was not much divergent activity. This paper will report on the more recent Slovak efforts to
pursue just such changes.
Efforts to establish fiscal decentralization in Slovakia go back to the very beginnings of the
Republic. Although such efforts were not always impressive in either country before the preaccession process for EU membership began, they should be considered the foundation of the
Slovak Republic‟s New System. As that process continued, both republics became committed to
“reforms of public administration” and to move from two levels of governance – central and
municipal – to four levels. They prepared to submit themselves to governance from Brussels and
also to add a regional level of government to assist in providing public services. Legislation provided
for the necessary institutional changes in both countries, but it was in Slovakia that the reform of
public administration was seen as a complement to rather than a substitute for fiscal
decentralization. The public administration reforms were also a part of the foundation, although in
some respects they also constitute a part of the superstructure of the New System.
Section II of this paper will review the initial elements of fiscal decentralization in the Slovak
Republic with special reference to the property tax as a potential source of “own revenues.” Section
III will address the divergent development of the two republics in spite of the initial institutional
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similarities of their fiscal decentralization programs. The reforms of public administration will be
addressed in Section IV, along with the implications of the Slovak introduction of the “single tax”
and the introduction of the New System‟s local finance measures implemented at the beginning of
2005. Section V provides a consideration of the macro effects of the New System and the
resurgence of economic growth in the Slovak Republic. The final section provides summary and
conclusions.
II. Fiscal Decentralization in the Early Slovak Transition
From 1918 to 1993, Slovakia1 was an unhappy partner in Czechoslovakia. With the end of
WWII, democracy faltered and the union continued as a Soviet-type Socialist Republic. Since late
1989, and after the end of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA), both the Czechs and Slovaks have been in transition to democratic, market
systems. But it is important to consider the fiscal foundation of local autonomy. It would have been
logical to utilize the property tax and local user fees as revenue sources for the provision of
municipal services based on local preferences. This would have been a natural part of reestablishing
local autonomy after the long era of heavy centralization. But an effective property tax must be
based upon the market value of property, since the market is a non-arbitrary reflection of the
incomes and the preferences that determine property values. A property tax system based on
market real estate values is just now becoming a reality in Slovakia. For economic and political
reasons, a normally functioning real estate market, like the new market system generally, has been
developing only gradually. Legacies of the socialist era and constraints on the privatization of
property have not been the only roadblocks. Early in the transition, the Slovak central government
preferred to ignore local self-government, postponing the dramatic progress that was to emerge
later. Nevertheless, transition reform efforts launched after the Velvet Revolution were rather
successful.
In 1992, without any formal consultation with the Slovak people, political leaders unilaterally
decided to abandon the federation. Slovak leaders rejected any partnership with the Czechs, along
with the Czech preference for a rapid transition to a market orientation.2 Both before and after the
opening of the reform era, the Slovaks were substantially less comfortable with departure from the
order and security of the Soviet ways than were the Czechs.
As one would expect, however, the Slovak self-government and fiscal systems continued for
a time to resemble those developed jointly with the Czechs before 1993. In the aftermath of the
Velvet Revolution, both republics permitted municipalities to seek independence from some of the
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forced amalgamations of the previous era. Under socialist rule, local autonomy had largely been lost.
From 1950 until 1989 decisions about the quality and type of public services were made by central
governments in Prague and Bratislava. District governments existed during this period only to
implement and facilitate the policies of the central government. Local government activity was also
limited almost exclusively to such “state administration” activities.
We should remember that the economic transition of these countries followed hard on the
heels of an era in which centralism had been rather absolute. Funding decisions had been based on
political and party influence and evinced no close relationship to the needs or demands for public
services, especially in the area of capital expenditures. Many local services were provided by the
central government, e.g., police, public utilities, fire protection and education. Socialist systems also
provided a number of services rarely provided by western governments, including housing, which
was produced and managed by the central government just as medical care was. Still, permitting only
rather symbolic local government actually ran counter to Slovak tradition and inclination.
When the transition era began in 1989, local governments increased in strength and number.
There are currently 2,781 of them and only a few have a population in excess of 50,000. The
majority of Slovak municipalities have fewer than 500 inhabitants and many have less than 100.
Comparing the number of municipalities per 10,000 inhabitants in Central and Eastern European
countries reveals that Slovakia has significantly more cities than other countries in the region (except
for the Czech Republic, of course).
The diminutive size of Slovak and Czech municipalities raises the question whether they
have sufficient personnel and resources to administer local government effectively. Several
supportive organizations have assisted in the development of a professional core of local public
managers. About 125 of the cities in the Republic have created the position of City Manager to assist
Slovak elected officials in their management functions. There is also an organization of city finance
directors whose operations are similar to those of the Government Finance Officers Association in
the United States.3
In Bratislava, the Association of Cities and Towns of Slovakia (Združenie Miest A Obci
Slovenska, ZMOS) represents local governments in their interaction with the Central Government.
This association is similar to those of numerous other countries; it has over 2,700 members and thus
represents over 95% of Slovakia‟s municipalities.4
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Decentralization Difficulties and the Property Tax in Transition Countries
Overcoming the legacies of central planning has proven to be a difficult and slow process.5
And to say that local governments have often remained under-funded is a euphemism. Having no
significant sources of independent funding, municipalities have had to wait for transfers and grants
from central governments often struggling financially themselves. Central governments have
generally been unwilling to abandon the centralist traditions of the previous era, which implies a
policy preference for indirect and non-transparent taxes and for public services which provoke no
substantive political opposition. Citizens of the localities have been disinclined to pay for public
service provision; they have preferred funding through transfers from the center rather than from
local taxation. Central governments are certainly not always unwilling to transfer resources to local
governments, but they do have a penchant to retain control over the programs funded (both as a
matter of reflex action and governance philosophy). As the transition began, the citizens of
transition countries were not always opposed to rather sparse provision of public goods, since they
anticipated a larger and more readily available assortment of the private goods they perceived to be
common to market economies. Thus, they tacitly accepted the willingness of their local
governments not to pursue any substantial efforts to charge fees or impose property taxes that could
finance a greater abundance of public goods based on these independent sources of revenues. As a
result, local officials were rarely forced to confront their constituencies with taxes to fund needed
services.
When Czechoslovakia began to decentralize its fiscal system in 1990, legislation borrowed
heavily from Western Europe, adopting taxes prevalent there without reference to whether they
might prove optimal for transition countries, or whether that system could generate revenues
sufficient for their needs. Since the end of communism, fiscal crises have been common in the
transitioning countries and transfers of funds from the center have been insufficient to cover needs.
Municipalities have been unable to enjoy genuine autonomy, because they lack sufficient sources of
independent revenue.
The property tax, potentially a most important source of independent local revenues,
remained strictly the nominal tax it had been under central planning. So it could not provide
revenues at levels that would have promoted the autonomy of municipal governments. In the
transition period, the four most important revenue sources for the Slovak Republic have been the
familiar VAT, the personal income tax, corporate income tax, and an income tax on unincorporated
businesses. All of these are collected by the central government and when they are shared with local
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governments, the problem of attached “strings” weighs upon municipal independence. Being
dependent on these taxes (only the VAT produced revenues that were not shared with local
governments) made the municipalities rather completely dependent fiscally on the central
government.
After the Velvet Divorce, institutional inertia and preoccupation with other problems kept
either republic from making substantive changes in their identical fiscal systems for some time.
Ostensibly, pre-accession motivation provided by the European Union convinced the Slovak
Republic to launch its recent, bold reforms. But before that time, the differences between the two
fiscal systems were not great. The Slovak fiscal system was inclined less toward centralization than
its Czech counterpart, although both countries emphasized a desire to achieve decentralization and
to develop self-government (samosprava) for their municipalities.
Property Tax Rate and Base
Let us begin by reviewing the original transition system of inter-governmental finance that
was already in place at the time of the Velvet Divorce. In this system, property tax policy was
established by the central government and national legislation, but the day-to-day administration of
the property tax was largely the domain of the Slovak municipalities. This contrasts with the Czech
situation in which the central government collects the property tax and redistributes the revenues to
the municipalities.
The taxation of land was based on the area of each individual parcel; similarly, the taxation
of buildings was based on the number of square meters of a structure‟s floor space, including the
land area under buildings. The tax rate was established separately for the two kinds of properties. In
the property tax formula, adjustments are made for the location of land and buildings and for the
particular utilization of the taxed unit. These modest, largely symbolic efforts to account for market
characteristics are a genuflection to market valuation.
Of the eleven Slovak classifications of land, eight adjusted the assessed tax value for the
quality of the land, which was estimated by the Ministry of Agriculture. The data collected on
quality and potential productivity were remarkably detailed. Parcels of close proximity sometimes
had substantial differences in estimated productivity.
In the transitional property tax system, basic tax rates ranging from one SKK to ten SKK
per square meter (adjustable annually) were applied to six classes of buildings ranging from
residential to industrial. The basic rate increased by .75 SKK for each floor. The tax on buildings
allowed for two additional adjustments:
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Data on the size and type of a building could be multiplied by a population-based
coefficient, that for the largest cities being greater than that for the smallest towns by a
factor of 4.5.



the local administrator could apply a final coefficient to the formula evaluating a building‟s
location within the city. This could increase or reduce the tax bill by as much as 50%, giving
city administrators a modest degree of flexibility in taxing for differential location qualities.
Prior to the New System, data on per capita land and building taxes revealed a pattern of

significant revenue generation in Slovak municipalities. With increasing municipal size, per capita
revenues from the tax on land declined continuously. For tax on buildings, per capita tax revenues
increased continuously with a municipality‟s size. For larger cities, in other words, the tax burden
was shifted more to structures. The implications were important: because real estate is a resource
that cannot be removed from a region to avoid the tax. Of course, one can move away from a home
or a business to avoid the additional costs imposed by such a tax. But the costs of doing so may be
quite prohibitive as compared to the costs of avoiding other taxes, e.g., an excise tax, by simply
deciding not to purchase the taxed article. In any case, the real estate tax is underutilized in Slovak
cities, keeping badly needed revenues below their potential. Moreover, although there was doubtless
an intent that these taxes would be borne by businesses, in selling to local inhabitants the tax burden
would ultimately be shifted to consumers.
The property tax law of the Slovak Republic granted explicit exemptions for state-owned,
cultural, religious, and other such properties. An exempt owner of commercial real estate was taxed
at a rate of about one third of that for commercial organizations. In the larger cities, exemptions
have represented a substantial portion of the potential property-tax base, severely limiting the
revenue capacity of the tax system. Implementing a tax system with capacity to generate a significant
portion of the revenues needed for public services, then undermining the program with exemptions
is clearly self-defeating.
In pursuit of a presumed objective to promote private housing construction, explicit, fifteenyear exemptions have been granted in Slovakia for newly constructed and recently renovated homes.
Since the property tax base and rates of the transitional system did not produce a large yield, the
incentive effect of this policy had little actual significance. Buildings restituted to former owners
were also relieved of property taxes for a fifteen year period.
In the transition system, local governments were responsible for the collection of property
tax data and the tax itself. They relied on the centrally operated cadastre for information pertaining,
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for example, to the ownership of properties. Specific information on land areas is available from the
cadastre, but that agency is of limited help in identifying land. Since it does not record information
on building size, it can obviously provide no assistance in assessing the tax on buildings.
In the Slovak property tax, the municipality/taxpayer relationship has been fraught with
asymmetric information. Information laws have prevented the municipalities from verifying
important information through the cadastre, rendering them dependent upon the taxpayer for
information about taxable land and buildings. Despite this problem, the finance ministry has not
publicized any concerns about property tax compliance. Restructuring the fiscal system to increase
property tax yields in a substantial manner, however, is likely to produce a compliance problem. It
should be no surprise, therefore, that changes in property tax laws proceeded only gradually in the
transition era.
One might expect with an area-based tax that there will be a close relationship between the
area of a plot or of a building and the tax revenues either would generate. Interestingly, this is not
always the case in Slovakia.6 The rubric “area-based” merely distinguishes this tax from one based on
market value; it does not imply that other variables play no role in the determination of tax revenues.
Certain classes of land are taxed far more heavily than others; building plots in all Slovakian cities
produce more revenue per square meter than arable land or forests. The same holds for taxes on
improvements – industrial and commercial buildings produce much greater revenues per square
meter than agricultural or apartment buildings. Apparently, the heaviest tax burden has been on
commercial and industrial activities, or on capital. Smaller towns and cities were inclined to tax
building plots more heavily than arable land; probably seen as less productive of revenues than farm
land, forests were subject to even less tax than the former.
This fairly extensive review of the early-transition, administrative property tax system has
been designed to show what a stark contrast the New System introduced at the beginning of 2005
represents.
III. The Property Tax and Municipal Budgets in the Transition
If fiscal decentralization is to succeed, local governments must have access to an
autonomous source of tax revenue, rather than be dependent upon the center for all revenues.7 The
visibility of the actions of local public officials, both elected and appointed, is generally greater than
those of national officials. The accountability of such officials logically increases with that visibility,8
and makes a strong case for local governance and local tax. The property tax embodies positive
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characteristics recommending it as a local tax. Since taxpayers cannot evade it by engaging in
transactions beyond a relevant political border, it is immobile. The imposition of this tax is similar in
effect to a lump-sum tax and does not induce changes in the level of utilization of the services of
taxed properties. An excise tax can affect the quantity of sales, impacting the price of a product; in
contrast, the property tax is considered a neutral tax. Since it provides fairly constant revenue yields
regardless of the state of the business cycle, it is stable. Relevant taxpayers are more likely to have the
means and the ability to pay the property tax, since they are home owners and property holders. This
is in contrast to the case of highly popular yet regressive excise taxes, which generally represent a
larger portion of lower than of higher incomes. If local public services improve and enhance
property values, it is appropriate that the beneficiaries, the property holders, are required to pay for
the increased value. Finally, as a direct tax, it is highly visible to taxpayers.9 There is a large literature
on fiscal decentralization that could be further cited here, but space considerations recommend
brevity; let us simply note that the sources presented in this paragraph also provide substantial
numbers of references explicating these now widely accepted principles of taxation.
The visibility of the property tax mentioned above is a two-edged sword, of course, which
has both advantageous and disadvantageous effects. Since it is direct and visible, citizens and
officials are less comfortable with the property tax than with indirect taxes.10 Generally, both
officials and citizens prefer excise taxes and local fees on a variety of transactions.11 Too frequently
local officials feel the heat of political problems the property tax can provoke.12
Fiscal decentralization can succeed only if the following three necessary conditions hold.
First, there must be a correspondence between the expenditure responsibilities of local governments
and the availability of financial resources. Second, incentives must be provided for subnational
governments to mobilize their potential resources in the pursuit of autonomy. Third, the provision
of transfers from the center must be transparent and based on objective and consistent criteria
rather than negotiation and ad hoc bargaining.13
It becomes apparent that the implementation of an effective property tax regime requires
close attention to institutions of governance. In countries where time and good judgment have
permitted these institutions to develop properly, however, the rewards of political autonomy have
been obtained by local governments.
Moral Hazard Problems in Property Tax Administration.
Principal/agent conflicts can be expected when the “ownership” (in terms of policy
prerogatives rather than revenue receipts) and the administration of the property tax are shared by
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central and sub-national governments. Conflicts arising from incentive incompatibilities rooted in
property-rights arrangements are common in transition countries, largely owing to the very divergent
perspectives and incentives of local and central governments.
Moral hazard problems arise when agents pursue their own interests rather than those of the
principal. In Slovakia, the property tax is the design of national policy, but it is collected by the
municipalities themselves. There is no malingering in the collection effort of the local governments,
since the revenues are badly needed. Since local authorities are in charge of the revenue-raising effort
they cannot malinger and the citizens can monitor those officials simply by observing what kinds of
revenues and expenditures they generate.
The significance of these institutional arrangements is apparent when contrasted to the
Czech case, where the local government basically acts as the principal and central government acts
as the agent. The center both designs policy and collects the tax, so that the local government
principal can receive such property tax revenues as the central agent‟s collection efforts provide. Not
being in a position to monitor the collection effort, sub-national governments can only hope that the
center will exert significant effort. The data show that revenue from these taxes is in fact suboptimal since the center lacks incentive to exert the effort and resources required to increase the
yield. Smaller property tax revenues, however, can easily be offset by greater transfers from other
taxes or revenue sources. This is certainly the case in the Czech Republic, where relative to other
transition countries the central government has not been a poor provider.
The Finance Ministry would argue that the local governments do not attempt to achieve
anything like optimal receipts, since they set their property tax coefficients such that their receipts
are only about half what they could be.14 But this should be expected from the structure of
incentives. Why should the locals push for greater property tax revenues when they can neither
collect the revenue nor monitor the collection? Why irritate local taxpayer acquaintances, friends and
neighbors with property tax when other funds will be provided. The fact that strings are attached to
such funds is nothing new; local officials have lived with such conditions previously.
It is also a form of moral hazard when local government officials, acting as (insufficiently
monitored) agents for the citizenry, the true “principal” in a democracy, fail to exert honest effort to
produce the revenues required for the public services citizens demand. Once municipalities become
financially dependent on the central government, they become quite willing to avoid full financial
responsibility by tacitly partnering in extant principal/agent arrangements. They become
comfortable in permitting the center to take all the responsibility for raising municipal funds, thus
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avoiding any potential political heat a serious property tax might generate. It is easier to conform to
central guidelines, mandates and directives than to take a stand for local preferences that clearly
differ from those of the center.
Still considering the Czech case, other moral hazard issues also emerge with central
government revenue transfers. For example, if the distribution of resources is badly skewed across
subnational governments, or if subsidies encourage local governments to pursue activities of high
priority to the center, fiscal redistribution becomes very tempting.15 But transfers from the center
may simply offset revenues that could have been raised locally. If the central government
compensates the municipality for the property tax funds it has failed to collect, local officials can act
less transparently.
Because the Slovak central government was initially far less generous in providing transfers,
Slovak municipalities had to take advantage of the opportunity to collect property tax revenues for
themselves. From the 1960s until the end of central planning, Czechoslovakia‟s local governments
derived roughly 60% of their total receipts from subsidies. From around 1984, however, central
government subsidies began to decline. This trend extended into the transition. Although there was
a brief expansion of transfers from 1990-1992, the decline continued. After the mid 1990s, subsidies
represented no more than about 25% of the total receipts of Czech and Slovak municipalities.16
The data for the transition period reveal the relevance of these moral hazard considerations.
They are reviewed comprehensively for the period of transitional finance in the two republics from
the end of central planning to 2000 by Bryson and Cornia.17 They show Slovakia‟s municipalities to
be substantially poorer than those of the Czech Republic. After the Velvet Divorce in 1993, Czech
municipal budgets were more than twice as large as those of Slovakia. This was at least partly a
result of per capita differences in grants from the respective central governments. By the end of the
period, per capita public services expenditures for Czech citizens were three times greater than those
for their Slovak counterparts. Local budgets in Slovakia were only about 14% of the total national
budget, while those of the Czech Republic ranged from one quarter to just over one-third of the
national budget.
The difference in municipal grants shows why Slovak municipalities were comparatively
quite poor. Grants in Slovakia ranged from 1.5 billion Slovak crowns (SKK) in 1993 to 1.1 billion
SKK in 1994. Central government grants to the Czech municipalities ranged from just over 27
billion CK in 1993, to 59.5 billion CK in 1996. (One should keep in mind, of course, that the

11

population of the Czech Republic is twice as large as that of Slovakia, but also that the Czech crown
will purchase from 1.2 to 1.25 Slovak crowns)
Interestingly, in the two years (1991 and 1992) preceding Slovak independence, Prague
provided grants of 7.9 billion and 2.4 billion crowns respectively for Slovak municipalities. Thus,
independence from the Czechs turned out to be a shock for the municipalities of the Slovak
Republic, for it separated them from the Czech central budget. In that period, Slovak municipalities
also learned that Mečiar politics separated them from the Slovak central budget. Prime Minister
Vladimir Mečiar, preoccupied with what the political opposition termed the “family privatization” of
Slovak industry, had no interest in helping solve the financial problems of Slovak towns, cities, and
regions. They knew they could expect no significant transfers or grants from Bratislava.
Since they had far less substantial financial support from the central government, Slovak
municipalities were much more diligent in their efforts to harvest property tax yields and the
property tax represented a significantly larger share of the total revenues of local governments.
Using data from the finance ministries of both republics, Bryson and Cornia18calculate that
for the years 1993 to 2001, the real estate tax in Slovakia provided from roughly 11 per cent to 18
per cent of the revenue for municipal budgets (see Table 1). On average, property tax revenue
represented a share of about 15% of the total receipts of Slovak municipalities. In the Czech
Table 1
Real Estate Tax as Percentage of Municipal Budget Revenues
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Czech Republic

4.80

4.74

4.01

3.93

3.60

3.43

3.42

3.28

3.68

Slovak Republic

10.45 13.81 12.57 14.73 15.60 16.97 18.81 17.89 16.00

Source: Bryson and Cornia, 2004.
Republic, with larger municipal budgets, the real estate tax ranged from 3.28% of total municipal
revenues up to a maximum of 4.8%. Although property tax revenues were relatively small in 1993,
the trend was toward even smaller receipts thereafter. The Slovak municipalities clearly
demonstrated greater effort in collecting the property tax. Table 2 demonstrates that the
municipalities of the Slovak Republic enjoyed a much smaller share of total national budget receipts.
Whereas the Czech municipalities received a share of around 30% of total governmental receipts,
Slovak municipalities received only around 6%. Given their relatively less favorable financial
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situation, it is no wonder that Slovak municipalities attempted more diligently to harvest greater
property tax revenues.
Table 2
Local Budgets as a Percentage Share of the National Budget
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Slovak Republic

5.89

6.82

6.46

7.70

7.61

6.91

5.67

6.19

6.95

Czech Republic

25.45

28.78 30.35 35.29 29.79 30.34 30.16 31.98 26.26

Source: Bryson and Cornia, 2004
Both republics struggled in the transition era with periodic fiscal crises, the result of which
was often a reduction in municipal revenues. The Czech government was relatively good about
avoiding unfunded mandates, but it retained strong influence over the use of centrally provided
funds, thus inhibiting local autonomy. The Slovak municipalities had little to work with, but seemed
more independent with what revenues they did receive.
IV. Beyond the Transition Era: Emergence of a New Fiscal System in Slovakia
Foundations of a new system were laid in Slovakia in the period preceding accession to EU
membership in May, 2004. The emphasis of the EU during that stage was not on fiscal
decentralization for the two republics, but on a related action, i.e., the reform of public
administration.
In marked contrast to the Slovak case, which we will review momentarily, the Czech
Republic was interested in little more than a honing of organizational arrangements in its reform of
public administration. The emphasis was on the creation of the new regional level of government.
The goal of the reforms was to modernize central administration and provide “territorial public
administration” to improve the quality of the public sector‟s products as a whole.19 Regional
governments are ostensibly to “bring state administration to the people” (přiblížit státní správu
občanům), involving rank and file citizens in subnational governance processes. But the question
whether the reform of public administration could effectively serve as a substitute for municipal
autonomy, i.e., for fiscal decentralization, was not really addressed.
While pursuing the mechanics of such organizational questions, the Czech Finance Ministry
and political apparatus were busy developing a more modern social welfare state than the wellknown version of the central planning era. The Soviet system provided pensions and health care and
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wages for a large national bureaucracy, of course, but these were all on the cheap. Health care costs
were very low because the wages of health care personnel were very low and high tech equipment
was not an important part of the system. Since the transition began, two processes have been
proceeding simultaneously: on the one hand, costs have begun to rise dramatically; on the other, the
government has been trying to reduce the “entitlement costs” of the communist system of public
goods provision (e.g., providing public transportation and housing at nominal costs). But in keeping
with the newly adopted model of Western Europe, the higher costs of the pensions, health care and
higher salaries and wages of government workers, things all vastly more expensive than they had
been under communism, the central government began to run large budget deficits and accumulate a
growing burden of debt. It has long since recognized the impossibility of coping with an indefinite
expansion of public expectations and commitments and is now desperately seeking ways to increase
national revenues. The reality of the macroeconomic situation is that it will be necessary to reduce
expenditures in the next few years. Unfortunately, this appropriate, even essential focus on the
national budget has at the same time removed the focus of the Finance Ministry and the political
system from the municipal situation and the process of fiscal decentralization.20
Decentralization and the Decline of State Administration in the Slovak Republic
In pre-reform Slovakia, as in the Czech case, samosprava (local self-government) was
performed by elected municipal officials. In a separate office, municipal “state administration”
activities and programs were performed by agents of the central government. An inference as to the
resources committed by the central government to finance and administrate the local affairs assigned
to the center constitutionally can be made from employment figures. Before the reform of public
administration in 2000, state administration employed 287,817 Slovak citizens. That represented
84.7% of total government employment. Only 52,100 were employed in self government at the local
level, which was only 15.3% of total government employment. After implementation of the
reforms, employment in state administration declined from c. 85% to 37%, while the number
employed in local self-government increased from c. 15% to 63%.21 In 2001 the total expenditures
of local offices of state administration (in other words of the central government for their local
jurisdiction) were nearly twice as high as those of the local governments themselves. Perhaps
without external pressure from the EU, Slovak public officials would still not have recognized the
necessity for a reform of their centralized institutions. From their perspective, “state administration”
represents little more than the state‟s appropriate resolution of the problem of very small
municipalities being unable to provide for their own management.
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The Reform of Public Administration: Foundation or Superstructure of the New System?
With the encouragement of the EU, Slovakia gave much more free play to political players,
the more progressive elements of the post-Mečiar era, who were very inclined to move toward
market decentralization. The reform of public administration and the New System were almost
simultaneous phenomena. The former introduced regional government and other institutional
changes and the New System changed the taxation and finance systems, both being complementary
developments building upon the efforts to achieve fiscal decentralization.
The conception and design of the Slovak reform of public administration was introduced by
an official paper22 listing the areas that would continue to be performed by local state administration
after the reform. The central government will accordingly continue to provide for local police,
criminal investigation, military administration, the state veterinary office, the state hygienist office,
the environmental office, the cadastral office, the land and forest office, the social office and the tax
office. This is an imposing list of activities for which Slovak municipalities and regions will continue
to have neither responsibility nor managerial prerogatives. As explained earlier, the Slovak
municipality, within its range of ceded responsibilities, received little funding but rather liberal
managerial authority throughout the transition era.
The Slovak national government intended for this situation to change and the reforms have
been bringing about the desired change in a striking manner. Reforms are also moving the
municipalities toward substantive change. The Slovaks recognize what such change requires and
that a modification of organizational forms alone cannot be an effective substitute for fiscal
decentralization. Effective governmental organization and fiscal decentralization are policy
complements rather than substitutes. The Slovak central government conceded23 that
decentralization of public affairs must include “decentralization of functional responsibilities,
decentralization of finances, decentralization of political power…” The complex process of
decentralization is only effective “if it is implemented in all three dimensions at the same time.”
The public administration reform is comprised of four processes: changing the territorial
arrangement, reforming extant institutions and creating the new regions, decentralizing public
finance powers and competencies and modernizing the system‟s legislative framework and
management. One should keep in mind that the fiscal reforms to be discussed in the next section
were closely related to the overall reform effort pursued over a period of several years. Nižňanský
and Pilat cogently present the entire transition era as a pursuit of multi-front reform.24 From the
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perspective of this paper, the new system‟s ramifications for local finance are of particular
importance.
Structuring the New System
While they were reforming, Slovak leaders wanted more than marginal organizational
change. They considered their economic future imaginatively and were prepared to implement
significant additional adjustments. At the same time, one should not overlook the fact that Slovak
economic development in the transition era has sometimes been stronger in relative terms than one
would have supposed, especially considering its political situation through the Mečiar era.
The initial economic successes Slovakia experienced in its independence era were due in
large measure to a mini-boom in exports. Prosperity and expansion in Western markets provided
demand, and Slovakia successfully made the transition from its links to the old CMEA markets to
the important EU markets. Sensible monetary policy kept inflation within bounds and although
development was spotty, leaving some regional unemployment levels high, progress was fairly
steady.
The introduction of reforms around 2000 came after the initial momentum of independence
had waned. The Slovaks were now ready to introduce some striking policies, including a “flat tax”25
also adopted in Russia, the Baltics and elsewhere. The main provisions of Slovakia‟s 19% flat tax
have been widely discussed; the Finance Ministry has spelled out the details of the New System,26
but its main provisions certainly deserve our attention here. From a general perspective, the
principle objective of the reform was to achieve fairness and simplicity while eliminating double
taxation.27 The key provisions of the New System at the national level were: introducing a flat rate of
income tax at 19%, both for corporate and personal incomes; adopting that same percentage rate for
the value-added tax (VAT); increasing consumption taxes to slightly above minimum required EU
rates; abolishing taxes on dividends, on the assignment and transfer of real estate, and on
inheritances and gifts; introducing a higher personal deduction for the taxpayer and a tax credit for
children; abolishing many exemptions, deductions, and distortions on efficiency in income taxation.
Here it should be said that the common level of taxation would appear to be regressive –
high and very high incomes being required to pay no greater income share in taxation than very low
incomes (although the Slovak Republic modifies this by allowing a level of non-taxable income
before the 19% tax applies). The basic justification is expressed well by Krajčír and Ódor,28 who site
the unfortunate rule in economics that “the size of the cake does depend on the manner in which it
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is sliced.. . . people lose more of the motivation to work and to engage in entrepreneurship when
each additional koruna earned is taxed heavier than the previous koruna.”
Of greater concern are the design and impact of the New System at the level of subnational
governments. One of the main changes initiated on January 1, 2005 as announced by the Ministry of
Finance29 was the elimination of the former method of making an annual allocation announcement
in and through the State Budget Act as to the amount of tax revenues to be transferred to the
municipalities. This process was “unstable” and did not permit the cities and towns to engage in
effective planning until after the announcement had been made. The new system is expected to
stabilize the flow of revenues to local governments and give them an opportunity to engage in
multiple-year financial planning.
The Finance Ministry also announced that the personal income tax had now become an
“own” source of revenues for both regions and municipalities. Of the total revenue from this tax,
municipalities were henceforth to receive 70.3% and the regions 23.5%. Only 6.2% of its revenue
was to accrue to the national budget.30 The basic reform idea was that henceforth roughly one third
of municipal revenues would come from personal income tax transfers, one third would come from
grants from the central government and the European Union and one third would come from
municipal own revenues, i.e., from the property tax, local user fees, and from privatization of
publicly-owned assets.31
Local governments also received the right as of January 1, 2005 to set “tax rates” (a term
applied, interestingly, not only to the real estate tax, but apparently also to the very limited number
of user fees and local taxes already extant) and to introduce new “taxes.” The municipalities
received full discretion to adjust those old system rates and apply exemptions according to their own
preferences.
These are measures of genuine fiscal decentralization, but it is potentially even more
important that the municipalities were also given policy control over the property tax. The applicable
legislation pertaining to real estate taxation, No. 582/2004 coll32 came into effect in January 2005. It
transfers the responsibility for establishing binding regulations on rates of taxation for land,
buildings, apartments and non-residential premises to local self-government bodies. They are to be
set according to the specific local conditions of municipalities. The law thus voids the utilization of
centrally-established coefficients related to the specific use and square-meter area of the taxed land
and structures.
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One perspective on the role of the property tax in the New System33 is that it was motivated
in part by the realization that the share of revenues from property taxes has been considerably lower
in the Slovak Republic than in numerous OECD and EU countries. As a result, the ministry
intended to strengthen that tax. First, the state denied itself any right to specify the uses to which
revenues from the real estate tax are to be put. Also, the donation tax, the inheritance tax and the
real estate transfer tax were eliminated as a part of the tax reform.34 The objective of the new Act on
Real Estate Tax was to create a legal basis for transparent taxation of real estate based on market
valuation.35
For the moment, the central government does not envisage strong increases in revenues
from the real estate tax. With the passage of time, it will probably be possible for municipalities
actually to implement increased property tax rates of their own (as the legislation asserts). It is
interesting that the Ministry‟s own Financial Policy Institute has noted that “the planned valuation of
real estate for the purposes of calculating real estate tax is also a step in the right direction; however,
the question remains of whether the related administrative costs will increase so much as to result in
a net loss for the public finances.”36 Thus, it would make sense to cover the relevant administrative
costs by permitting the substantive property tax increases that appear now to be officially legal.
The Transition within the Transition: Applying the New System
It should be observed that in the short time since the inception of the new system, the
property tax has not become a more important source of revenue. There have been no plans to
increase revenues from this source in budgets to 2007. Early in the year of the inception, it appeared
that municipal self-government had gained by these new developments. At the same time, resources
seemed no less scarce at the municipal level. As the changes in rules came into effect, the larger
cities felt that they gained less through the change than some of the smaller ones, but institutional
change in resource allocation often produces winners and losers, requiring some modifications or
institutional accommodation to the changed system.
The Government of the Slovak Republic37 made its own statement of policy intent
promising to protect the interests of taxpayers. It promised it would increase the tax revenues of
municipalities and define the tax revenues of regions in such a way as to assure that the tax burden
on individual taxpayers and businesses would not be increased. This was to be accomplished by the
creation of a special law “containing the definition and structure of tax revenues for municipalities
and higher territorial units and criteria for their redistribution to municipalities and higher territorial
units‟ budgets.” This intended assurance does little for the proponent of fiscal decentralization, since
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that concept seems threatened when central government defines tax structures for subnational
governments.
The Finance Ministry perception38 was that the reform of public administration and the
changes connected with the accession of Slovakia to the European Union were the driving forces
behind the creation of the new, comprehensive legislative framework developing the budgetary
process for the public sector. The Finance Ministry documents evince a far less distinct tone of
centralism.
V. A Tentative Assessment of Reform Effects
The new system as applied to local governments has been in the implementation phase for
only about two years at the time of writing. It is too early to say how effective the new system will
be, although it is clear that the effect will depend both on the macro impact of the new, national tax
system on the national budget and the ability of the municipalities to leverage their new policy
prerogatives into enhanced tax receipts.
Since the initiation of the new tax system at the national level late in 2003, Slovakia's
economic performance has improved. The improvement has been the focus of international
discussion. The Republic‟s recent growth rates have been strong at 5.5% in 2004, finishing the year
at 5.8% for the final quarter of the year.39 Growth in 2005 increased beyond expectations to 6%,
coming at a period of low growth throughout Europe generally. The IMF40 and OECD41 have
found Slovakia‟s strongly increased output expansion laudable and note that the country‟s fiscal and
external imbalances have declined considerably in recent years. The increased transparency and
greater incentive compatibilities, usually attributed to the reforms, have helped improve the business
climate and attract foreign direct investments. Real GDP expanded by 4.5 percent in spite of a
contraction in domestic demand in 2003. But increased activity in the domestic sector and
accommodating macroeconomic policies permitted real GDP growth beyond expectations in 2004
and 2005. Further progress is still badly needed; employment gains have been uneven across sectors
over the period described, and unemployment remained very high at 17.75 percent.
The World Bank agrees with this assessment,42 but observes the need for the Slovak
Republic


to achieve fiscal consolidation supportive of appropriate public finance management,



to complete ongoing reforms in health, pensions, and public finance,
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to develop income levels convergent with those of Europe by achieving trade
competitiveness in EU and world markets, and



to reduce poverty and unemployment, partially a function of Roma marginalization and the
east-west development gap in the country.
In the long term these achievements may be feasible if Slovakia can continue its currently

strong economic performance. Data from the Statistical Office confirm the recently strong growth,
but it is interesting to put it into temporal context. Table 3 indicates quarterly GDP for 2003 and
2004; Table 4 provides greater temporal perspective by showing annual GDP growth from 1993 to
Table 3
Slovakia GDP, 2003, 2004
(Mill SKK)
1. Q
2. Q
3. Q
4. Q
Year 2003
1. Q
2. Q
3. Q
4. Q
Year 2004
1. Q
2. Q
3. Q
4. Q
Year 2005

272,980
300,801
309,682
317,733
1,201,196
308,722
330,367
336,791
349,606
1,325,486
332,539
357,631
365,505
384,117
1,439,792

*Source: Ukazovatele Ekonomickeho Vývoja, Hrubý domáci produkt
a Štátny rozpočet, Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky, 2006.
See http://www.statistics.sk/
2004 in both current and constant prices, the latter removing the inflationary bias to provide
an indication of real growth rates per annum, as indicated in the last column of the table. These
numbers show the recent, positive economic performance, but are not unequivocal regarding
growth as a response to the stimulus provided by Slovakia‟s recent New System of national and local
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Table 4
Slovakia GDP Growth, 1993-2004
(Constant Prices, 1995=100)
Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Current P‟s Constant P‟s
Growth over previous yr.
411,366 512,849
495,649 544,674 6.20
576,502 576,502 5.84
638,449 611,935 6.15
712,679 640,151 4.61
781,437 667,107 4.21
844,108 676,919 1.47
934,079 690,697 2.04
1,009,839 716,845 3.79
1,098,658 749,937 4.62
1,201,196 783,406 4.46
1,325,486 826,493 5.50
1,439,792 876 283 6.02

Source: Ibid., and own calculations
finance. Nor can they yet show, more specifically, that recent growth performance is a response to
tax reductions. Since economic growth had been strong in the early transition period to about 1999,
the return to over four percent growth in 2002 could be interpreted simply as some kind of
economic recovery. Although European economies were largely stagnating in the slower years of
Slovak economic growth from 1999 through 2002, and the U.S. recession was going on, it is not
likely that this slowdown was simply cyclical. Such an explanation, however, might explain why
Slovakia, in an economic environment influenced by the stagnation of some important EU players,
likewise entered into a slower growth phase. It does not explain why a simple recovery beginning in
2000 and 2001 restored the Slovak Republic to its previously high growth rates in the stagnant
environment responsible for the slowdown. That leaves it necessary to consider the notion that
growth over the past two or three years was a function of economic stimulus arising from reduced
taxes and increased FDI in Slovakia. The Slovaks see the relationship between the “flat tax” and
FDI investment as stemming from the fact that the tax reform should be a catalyst for other structural
reforms no less important to the foreign investor, who is particularly interested in the improved business
milieu.43
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Crediting the New System with ending the period of sluggish growth, however, does not
explain what it was that made the country perform well in the earlier transition period under the old
fiscal system. Such an explanation might lean on Slovakia„s reaping the benefits of a successful shift
from trade with CMEA markets to EU markets, along with positive economic conditions and
expectations in the region during the early transition period. These things were followed by a boom
in the U.S. economy and the stimulus that phenomenon provided the world economy in the late
1990s.
But our concern here is less with the macro performance of the Slovak economy in this
period than with the budget performance. It is of interest to the present study that growth in the
macro economy has not yet translated into higher general budget receipts. From the perspective of
the Slovak government, the rationale for the New System would have to be that the elimination of
some taxes and the reduction in tax levels should provide growth stimulus sufficient to offset the
reductions. The Finance Ministry web site indicates that targets for individual types of tax revenues
after the implementation of the reforms were generally met. Overall, however, examining
accumulated revenues and expenditures makes it appear that the growth of revenues has not
matched government expenditures or general growth.
The third column of Table 5 shows accumulated monthly receipts, while accumulated
expenditures are shown in column four. A simple calculation of the growth of budget receipts and
budget expenditures yields results that are interesting to compare with GDP or general economic
growth. To make the measurements comparable, the data are taken in current prices. We observe that
government revenues from 2003 to 2004 grew at the rate of only 4.01%, while GDP grew at the rate
of 10.35%, again in current prices. (Without adjusting to constant prices, we overstate growth
proportionately for the general economy as well as for budget receipts and expenditures in the period
in question, some of the growth being accounted for simply by price increases. So budget receipts
did not grow as rapidly as the economy as a whole, reducing the advantage of the rapid economic
growth from the perspective of the public sector. It is important to note, as the Slovak Republic
currently struggles with national deficits and debt, that policymakers managed to make the growth
in expenditures (8.21%) more in line with the increased GDP growth, although it was still a little less
than the growth of the economy. Whether this rate of growth of expenditures seems justified or
appropriate, it still contributed to deficits and debt, since it exceeded the more modest growth rate of
revenues of only 4.01%.
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Table 5
Republic of Slovakia: Budget and GDP Growth, 2003-2005*
M Y Year Mo
ΣRevs ΣExpends
2003 1
22,300
24,000
2003 2
31,800
44,800
2003 3
46,400
64,200
2003 4
67,008
91,600
2007 5
79,100 109,600
2003 6
100,900 128,600
2003 7
127,700 158,800
2003 8
147,100 180,200
2003 9
163,400 201,100
2003 10
186,800 227,200
2003 11
203,600 246,400
2003 12
233,100 289,000
2004 1
21,031
23,689
2004 2
36,394
40,818
2004 3
66,945
65,770
2004 4
98,132
92,409
2004 5
109,176 111,446
2004 6
120,695 133,150
2004 7
139,126 157,677
2004 8
153,715 178,501
2004 9
172,840 202,262
2004 10
195,858 226,386
2004 11
213,675 247,753
2004 12
242,444 312,732
2005 1
24,644
20,334
2005 2
39,789
40,897
2005 3
65,0463
62,246
(Millions SKK, Current Prices)

Source: Plnenie Ŝtátneho Rozpočtu, Ukazovatele Ekonomickeho Vývoja, , Štatistický
úrad Slovenskej republiky, 2005. See http://www.statistics.sk/
V. Summary and Conclusions
The relatively strong transitional beginning Slovakia enjoyed did not translate into well-being
for the local governments. In this period characterized as one of fiscal decentralization,
municipalities had to work very hard to generate local revenue, which was done mostly through
energetic collection of property tax revenues, the imposition of centrally-specified, local user fees
and the privatization of state-owned assets transferred to municipalities at the outset of the
transition period.
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The reforms of public administration, undertaken in the period prior to Slovakia‟s accession
to the European Union, were followed closely by the adoption of a New System of national and
local finance that caught wide attention because of the elimination or reduction of many of the
country‟s taxes, both national and local, and the adoption of a “flat tax,” or a common rate of 19%
for corporate and personal income tax, as well as for the VAT.
It was hoped that this new system would provide encouragement for investment (both
domestic and foreign) and stimulate economic growth. The economic growth rate did increase
substantively, which was unusual given the sluggish conditions prevailing in most of Europe at the
time. One might postulate that the growth of the past two or three years is just a return to an earlier,
normal level of performance. But that explains neither why the early transition growth rates were
not maintained nor why they were recently resumed. It seems reasonable, as was suggested in the
previous section, that the original growth period ended with the incentive incompatibilities of the
old finance system, the loss of early transition momentum and the lack of dynamism in Europe in
general. Growth momentum was regained when reforms were given renewed vigour early in the
present decade. And growth is expected to continue. Prognosis updates performed by the Ministry
of Finance confirm that the economy of the Slovak Republic can achieve high growth in the next
few years at an average annual rate of about 5.4%. The growth is believed to be sustainable because
of the qualitative economic changes achieved in terms of total productivity growth. Expected GDP
growth for 2007 exceeds the 6% level in 2005 because of the expected economic growth of
important trade partners of the Slovak Republic, because of the effects of FDI inflows, and because
of the expected impacts of greater transfers from EU programs.
The recent local government provisions of the New System are bold and consistent with the
changes made at the national level. They do in fact provide municipalities with greater opportunities
to find their own way financially, which will enhance their political autonomy. Nevertheless, the
local governments remain fiscally challenged. As the state assigned the lion‟s share of personal
income tax receipts to local governments, it simultaneously transferred the responsibility to them to
fund a large proportion of the education programs previously funded nationally. But greater
opportunities were also provided for the subnational governments (regions had been added to
territorial samosprava) to act with greater fiscal autonomy. The state will not permit municipalities to
expand local property tax efforts in a manner that will increase the overall burden of Slovakia‟s
taxpayers, but municipalities do have opportunities to function much more independently. The use
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of such independence could ultimately open the way for a substantial, badly-needed increase in the
revenue-generating capacity of subnational governments in the future.
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